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Iran has restarted its nuclear weapons programs. US, UK and France are calling for emergency hearing. Well we're at a crossroads. Will the UN do anything. I don't think so. Three things can happen. Israel destroys the Iranian program. Despite what I've heard from people Israel does have the capability. Two in order to avoid the Iranian people from turning on the west due to an Israeli attack the US decides to take military action itself. Third if time allows we fund a revolution. Give all forms of aid to the rerformers in Iran. Intelligence, money, weapons if necasary, political support etc.

What do you guys think?
That chances of 0, 1, 2, or 3 are very small. bordering on zero.

(0 -- UN acting, 1 -- Israel acting, 2 -- Us acting, 3 -- Iranians acting)

It may be more interesting to try to predict the implications of a nuclear armed Iran. One possible prediction is Bush' presidency going into the history books as the worst one since Carter...or ever.
CSIS, 11 Jan 06: Heading off an Iranian Nuclear Weapons Capability
Quote:Iran’s January 9th decision to resume its uranium enrichment program creates an immediate international crisis. Iran’s move is a test of the international community’s resolve and ability to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. An inadequate response could leave Iran’s pathway to a nuclear weapon wide-open and could be a further, potentially fatal blow to the norm of nonproliferation. This, is turn, opens the prospect of future nuclear nations in the years to come. The Bush administration’s support for European negotiating efforts with Iran over the past year has laid the ground work for an international consensus on confronting Iran’s actions, but it remains to be seen if Russia and China are prepared to support such efforts.

Despite its resumption of nuclear research, it is important to remember that Tehran is not yet at the point where is can actually enrich uranium or produce nuclear weapons. That capability might still be years away. The presence of international inspectors, while not a guarantee against diversion, will provide an important resource in tracking Iran’s nuclear progress. But in rejecting international pressure – including coordinated letter of concern from all five veto wielding members of the UN Security Council - and restarting work at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, Iran has resumed its on again, off again march toward mastering the entire nuclear fuel cycle. There should be no question that Iran’s mastery of uranium enrichment – regardless of their stated intentions -- would also give Iran the ability to produce nuclear weapons...
From the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, Nov 05:

Getting Ready for a Nuclear Iran
Quote: As Iran edges closer to acquiring a nuclear bomb and its missiles extend an ever darker diplomatic shadow over the Middle East and Europe, Iran is likely to pose three threats. First, Iran could dramatically up the price of oil by interfering with the free passage of vessels in and through the Persian Gulf as it did during the l980s or by threatening to use terrorist proxies to target other states’ oil facilities. Second, it could diminish American influence in the Gulf and Middle East by increasing the pace and scope of terrorist activities against Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, Israel, and other perceived supporters of the United States. Finally, it could become a nuclear proliferation model for the world and its neighbors (including many states that otherwise would be more dependent on the United States for their security) by continuing to insist that it has a right to make nuclear fuel under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and then withdrawing once it decides to get a bomb. To contain and deter Iran from posing such threats, the United States and its friends could take a number of steps: increasing military cooperation (particularly in the naval sphere) to deter Iranian naval interference; reducing the vulnerability of oil facilities in the Gulf outside of Iran to terrorist attacks, building and completing pipelines in the lower Gulf region that would allow most of the non-Iranian oil and gas in the Gulf to be exported without having to transit the Straits of Hormuz; diplomatically isolating Iran by calling for the demilitarization of the Straits and adjacent islands, creating country-neutral rules against Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty state members who are suspected of violating the treaty from getting nuclear assistance from other state members and making withdrawal from the treaty more difficult; encouraging Israel to set the pace of nuclear restraint in the region by freezing its large reactor at Dimona and calling on all other states that have large nuclear reactors to follow suit; and getting the Europeans to back targeted economic sanctions against Iran if it fails to shut down its most sensitive nuclear activities.
An older article (12 Aug 04) from CNS/MIIS, but still worth the read:

A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences
Quote:At a time when Iraq and the war on terrorism tend to dominate the debate on international affairs, the possibility of an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities has not been a major topic of discussion in the United States. There are reports, however, that the Bush administration has seriously considered this option but opted to put it on the back burner for the time being. Further, on May 6, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Resolution 398 in a 376-3 vote, calling on the U.S. government "to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons." If a similar resolution passes the Senate, it will give President Bush or any future administration the ability to launch a preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities whenever this is deemed necessary.

In Israel, planning and rhetoric appear to have progressed quite a bit further; it appears that some in Israel are seriously considering a preemptive attack similar to the June 1981 attack on Osirak that destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor. Meir Dagan, the Chief of Mossad, told parliament members in his inaugural appearance before the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iran was close to the "point of no return" and that the specter of Iranian possession of nuclear weapons was the greatest threat to Israel since its inception. On November 11, 2003, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said that Israel had "no plans to attack nuclear facilities in Iran." Less than two weeks later however, during a visit to the United States, Israel's Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that "under no circumstances would Israel be able to tolerate nuclear weapons in Iranian possession" and just six weeks earlier, Mossad had revealed plans for preemptive attacks by F-16 bombers on Iranian nuclear sites. This report will examine the following: The Iranian nuclear facilities most likely to be targeted and their proliferation risk potential; the likely preemptive scenarios involving Israel or the United States; and the possible consequences of any preemptive action...
From the 14 Jan Economist: When the soft talk has to stop
Quote:On January 10th, Iranian officials removed inspectors' seals and prepared to re-start experiments at the pilot uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz. By doing so, they have sabotaged efforts to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions by negotiation rather than confrontation. Iran evidently calculates that it will survive the fallout. For the rest of the world, however, its defiance is a critical test.

Crossing the enrichment threshold will not only bring two years of negotiations with Britain, France and Germany to a halt. By ending the suspension of nuclear activities at Natanz that had sustained these talks, Iran has also brushed aside appeals from two of its semi-friends, Russia and China, ignored calls to desist from the 35-nation board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN's nuclear guardian, and dismissed pleas from the IAEA's director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei, to do more to build confidence that its nuclear activities are as peaceful as it claims. For if Iran's intentions are not peaceful, and it manages now to cheat on regardless, the credibility of IAEA safeguards and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) these are designed to uphold will be severely damaged.

Shrugging off all such protests, Iran claims that all it will be doing is resuming modest research and development work, and that all it has ever wanted to do is produce low-enriched (up to 5%) uranium (LEU) so that nuclear power stations can help keep the lights on. Indeed, that is so far all the fast-spinning centrifuge machines it is installing at Natanz are configured for. But there are strong suspicions that its nuclear activities—kept secret for 18 years until disclosed by a dissident group in 2002, and declared last November by the IAEA to be in violation of its safeguards commitments under the NPT—have a more sinister purpose.

Iran has no pressing need to start enrichment work now. Pierre Goldschmidt, formerly in charge of safeguards at the IAEA and now a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recently pointed out that Russia has guaranteed at least ten years' supply of fuel to Iran's single almost-ready reactor, at Bushehr. No other reactors are yet being built, and the fuel-fabrication plant will not be fully up and running until 2012. Yet by experimenting at Natanz, even enriching only tiny quantities of uranium gas, Iran will be learning skills that can be used just as easily to make the highly enriched (90% and over) uranium (HEU) needed for the fissile core of a bomb.

In other words, once enrichment is fully mastered, the only bar to a military programme is intent. Assuming it does want a bomb, how far is Iran from having one? No one knows. But it could soon have several break-out options.

Looking for clues
According to an assessment by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in September 2005, by feeding the uranium it produces back through the 1,000 centrifuges it plans to run at Natanz, Iran could take three years to produce a bomb's worth (25kg) of HEU. However, the 50,000-centrifuge commercial plant being built nearby would speed things up a lot. And rather than making its intentions so transparent, Iran could also seek to build up stocks of LEU (the harder part of the enrichment process) for later quick conversion to HEU, possibly at an undeclared enrichment plant elsewhere.

Does Iran have a hidden military programme? Inspectors are unsure. Although they have winkled out a lot of information, the gaps are troubling. Unexplained traces of enriched uranium suggest more “experiments” than have been accounted for so far. Questions remain about what Iran really did with plans it bought on the black market for more efficient centrifuge machines (left gathering dust in a cupboard for years, it says), and whether it used designs it was given by these traffickers for shaping uranium metal in ways useful in weapons-making (no, it insists). Iran has refused to allow full inspection of some military sites thought to be connected with nuclear work, including at least one where high-explosive testing of bomb-triggers may have taken place.

Other evidence adds to this disturbing pattern. For more than a year, America's intelligence agencies have been studying a cache of computer files that appear to show design work by Iranian scientists on a missile cone configured in just the way needed to accommodate a nuclear warhead. Administration officials showed some of this evidence late last year to Russia and China in the hope of winning their active support at the IAEA for declaring Iran in non-compliance with its obligations. (In the end, both abstained on the resolution but let it pass.)

Meanwhile, Iran has long collaborated with North Korea on missile development, testing and deploying its own versions of the North's nuclear-capable Nodong missile, with a range of 1,200km, and possibly collaborating on the longer-range Taepodong missile too. In a forthcoming article in Survival, Mark Fitzpatrick of the IISS suggests that such co-operation may recently have extended to nuclear work. Both regimes bought nuclear equipment from the black-market network, run by Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer Khan, which also supplied Libya and others until it was busted. Few other countries would be ready to help Iran with its nuclear projects at present.

The struggle to negotiate
While most governments agree that Iran should not be allowed to build nuclear weapons, if that is indeed its intent (some Iranian officials talk privately of wanting an “option” on a bomb, rather than the bomb itself), it has proved exceedingly difficult to get them to agree on how to stop it. The Europeans first launched their diplomatic initiative in hopes of forestalling more forceful action, either by the United States or by Israel. But the going has been very tough, in part because at first they lacked the full support of some of the bigger players, including America.

That changed early in 2005 when President George Bush decided that, instead of opposing all dealings with Iran, he would throw his weight behind the European effort, albeit without much expectation of success. He also stopped opposing Russia's work on the Bushehr reactor for Iran, having successfully pressured the Russians to insist on return of the spent fuel. The Europeans, now with American and Russian backing, have been offering Iran a package of inducements, including improved trade and political ties and joint work on other less sensitive nuclear projects, if Iran will agree to give up all plans to enrich uranium or make plutonium (another potential bomb ingredient). Given Iran's past lies and evasions, the European three argued, ending all such nuclear work was the only “objective guarantee” that its activities would remain peaceful.

But as America moved to back the European initiative, Iran started to pull away from talks. After the unexpected election of a radical new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, things got even stickier. Last August, Iran restarted its plant at Isfahan that converts natural uranium ore in stages into a gas called uranium hexafluoride that can later be spun in centrifuges. That was already a first breach of its suspension agreement with the Europeans.

Most recently Iran rejected a Russian-backed compromise that would have allowed conversion work to continue, but with the gas converted to LEU on Russian soil and subsequently returned to Iran for use as nuclear fuel. This would have kept Iran from more dangerous nuclear dabbling and so allowed space for talks to continue. But Iran has suggested it would only accept the idea if some enrichment work were to continue in Iran too, which rather negates the point of the exercise.

Has diplomacy therefore failed? The Europeans say they have managed to delay Iran's enrichment work by at least two years. More important, however, by maintaining a united front among themselves (not always easy), and gaining American and Russian support, they have also managed to focus attention on Iran's obligations under the NPT to observe safeguards commitments and not to seek nuclear weapons, not just the “rights” to fuel-making technologies that Iran claims for itself. And they set out more clearly the lines that Iran (and anyone else with a cloud of suspicion over them) must not cross. But that is why what follows is crucial, now that Iran has chosen to push across one such clear line and restart its enrichment work. Will the Europeans, America, Russia and others call Iran to account, or will they have their own bluff called instead?

A shortlist of options
The first step will be to convene an emergency meeting of the IAEA's board, likely later this month, to receive a formal report about what Iran has been up to. America has long pressed for Iran to be referred to the United Nations Security Council for its actions. Short of an about-face by Iran, the Europeans will now press hard for that outcome. A majority on the IAEA's board already favours referral. But for Iran to take notice, Russia, China and others will have to back the idea too. Both countries have been loth to lean hard on Iran in the past. But both are bitterly disappointed that its regime has upped the ante in this way.

Getting to the council is one thing; getting action from it is another. A presidential statement urging Iran to comply with inspectors' requests, and even assigning the IAEA wider investigative powers, might get through, since the point would be to strengthen the inspectors' hands, not take Iran's case away from them. Beyond that, other steps could include political sanctions, such as denial of visas for sporting teams or for members of Iran's regime (similar actions are thought to have helped in the past in dealing with the recalcitrant Serb government, for example). Unlike the North Koreans, who seem not to mind their isolation, Iranians take pride in their growing contacts around the world and are keen to be accorded the status and respect they feel their ancient civilisation deserves. That said, however, Iran's new president, eager to wipe Israel off the map, seems dangerously unfazed by world opinion (see article).

It would be tougher to win widespread support at the UN for economic sanctions. Several key countries, including Russia (which also recently signed a $1 billion weapons contract with Iran), China, India and Japan have been reluctant to put their oil and gas contracts and their pipeline projects at risk. Yet such targeted sanctions might be the one thing that could get Iran's full attention. Its energy industry is dependent on foreign investment for future expansion and modernisation. Meanwhile, India is an important supplier of refined petrol to Iran.

The Europeans have already hinted that if sanctions are blocked at the UN, they will impose their own. They will also try to get others to join them, rather as America has orchestrated the Proliferation Security Initiative, an informal posse of countries prepared to take tough action to block shipments of illicit goods and materials around the world related to weapons of mass destruction.

The last resort
Might force be the answer? Mr Bush has always said that no option is off the table. Israel says Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons and has suggested that, once Iran has mastered enrichment, perhaps as early as a few months from now, its nuclear programme will have passed “the point of no return”. Might either government be tempted to pre-empt the diplomacy with military strikes?

Israel's air force flattened Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. But Iran has learnt from that episode. It has dispersed, hidden and buried its numerous facilities; some sites, including Natanz, are up to 75 feet underground. Nor is sabotage much of an option. Ploys such as assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists or infecting Iranian computer systems with viruses would cause minimal damage. And yet there are military options, however imperfect and risky.

Only America could hope to demolish Iran's programme. The Iranians are believed to have, in addition to its main sites, at least a score with a role in the programme, and more than 100 sites suspected of having a role. To attack them all, with cruise missiles and fighter-bombers, would require an extended campaign and hundreds of sorties. Corridors would have to be cleared through Iran's air defences and the Iranian air force destroyed. Collateral damage, to Iranian civilians and cities, could be extensive.

A likelier alternative might be to launch an attritional campaign by attacking Natanz and Bushehr, recognising that the resulting damage would at best delay Iran's nuclear progress. This is certainly the most that Israel could contemplate unilaterally. Such an attack would be a declaration of a war which Israel could start but might not be able to finish without American protection. And Israeli fighter-bombers would find it hard to reach Iran without passing through American-controlled airspace.

To attack Iran this way would make sense only if it were thought likely that a friendlier Iranian regime would then emerge. But Iran has no obvious, friendly government-in-waiting. And Iran could strike back—by closing the oil chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz or hitting American or Israeli interests via proxies in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon and the occupied West Bank and Gaza. Israel is well within range of Iranian missiles. Diplomacy has not stopped Iran so far. But military action is by no means an attractive alternative.
NDU McNair Paper, published last year: Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran
Quote:U.S. Options
In dealing with the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, the United States has two basic options: either freeze the Iranian nuclear program with hopes of rolling it back (and constraining it to peaceful applications), or live with the program while containing its negative impacts. On the freeze/rollback side, the prospects for more than a temporary pause are not promising, in our estimation. As long as significant sections of the Iranian program remain opaque, it will be difficult to gauge the success of a diplomatic rollback strategy; and, of course, it would be easier to apply a strategy to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold than to try to reverse acquisition after the fact. Granted, a nuclear-armed Iran could be subject to increasingly onerous restrictions—ranging from diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions to military force and regime change. Military strikes or covert action could also be used to change Iran’s strategic direction or provoke regime change. The likelihood of success using these means, however, is low. Even if there were to be a new government in Iran, it would likely continue to pursue advanced nuclear capabilities, including at some point a weapon. However, an overt regime-change strategy would carry an extremely high risk that the Iranian regime would use its nuclear weapon in a last-ditch attempt to save itself.

Could the United States live with a nuclear-armed Iran? Due to U.S. strategic predominance, many experts believe the Iranian regime would be unlikely to use its nuclear capability overtly unless it faced what it perceived to be an imminent and overwhelming threat. An Iran emboldened by nuclear weapons might become more assertive in the region, but superior U.S. conventional capabilities and strengthened regional partnerships would probably deter Iran from significant mischief, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or attacking U.S. forces directly. The United States has options short of war that it could employ to deter a nuclear-armed Iran and dissuade further proliferation. These include reassuring allies and friends in the region, strengthening active and passive defenses, improving preemption and rapid response capabilities, and reenforcing nonproliferation incentives and counterproliferation activities. Nevertheless, the lack of confirmable information on Iran’s leaders, particularly on how they make decisions, what they fear, if they have a concept of deterrence, or whether they appreciate implicit redlines set by countries with whom they have no contact—the United States and Israel—makes forecasting this issue very difficult.

Finally, while some security experts, predominantly Israeli, fear that Iran’s leaders would provide terrorists with nuclear weapons, we judge, and nearly all experts consulted agree, that Iran would not, as a matter of state policy, give up its control of such weapons to terrorist organizations and risk direct U.S. or Israeli retribution. Many specialists on Iran share a widespread feeling that Iran’s desire to be seen as a pragmatic nuclear power would tend to rein in whatever ideological impulses it might otherwise have to disseminate nuclear weapons or technologies to terrorists. There is less agreement, however, on whether the regime in Tehran could reliably control all elements within the Iranian system that might have the means, motive, and opportunity to do so.

Arguably, the costs of rollback might be higher than long-term containment of a nuclear-armed Iran. The United States would be expected to offer incentives to Iran and to governments cooperating with its strategic choices in what could be a long period of rollback. Even if the United States decides to embark on a rollback strategy, it would have to maintain a deterrence strategy while other diplomatic, economic, and military options played out. The good news is that many of the capabilities needed for deterrence and containment are the same as those needed for more robust military options. That may enable the United States to play both strategies for an undetermined length of time.

In our reexamination of the strategic implications for U.S. security policy and planning in the event Iran completes plans for nuclear weapons development, two sets of questions kept intruding on our research. The first involves the discussions between the EU–3 and Iran: What is the full extent of the European Union’s bargaining position; are there more carrots than sticks; would it remain firm in its dealings with an obstreperous Iran; could it possibly succeed in gaining Iran’s commitment to end its efforts to acquire the full cycle of nuclear weapons production; and what would happen if the EU effort fails?

In various unofficial meetings between European, American, and Iranian scholars, the Iranians have accused the Europeans of betraying them to the Americans in order to improve EU–U.S. relations, which had been disrupted by European opposition to the 2003 Iraq war. The Europeans have countered that their objection to Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons technology is not directed solely against Iran; rather, it is meant to prevent all new acquisition efforts. If Iran crosses the nuclear weapons threshold, the European representatives said in unison, then the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, indeed, all non- or counterproliferation regimes will be finished. Surely, they ask, Iran could understand the great danger the spread of nuclear weapons posed to everyone. Clearly, the idea that the United States and the Europeans were in consensus on this issue had caught the Iranians’ attention. To offer some insight into the delicate negotiations between the EU–3 and Iran, we have added to this study a timeline describing Iran’s historic path to nuclear power and an appendix on "Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status, Risks, and Prospects".

The second question frequently asked concerns Israel’s perception of an Iranian nuclear threat and its options in dealing with what it describes as the greatest danger to its security today. To offer special insight on this issue, we include a paper by Israeli scholar Gerald Steinberg entitled "Walking the Tightrope: Israeli Options in Response to Iranian Nuclear Developments".
I do not believe that Western Civilization is going to allow a radical Islamic state to have nuclear weapons.
Ron Lambert Wrote:I do not believe that Western Civilization is going to allow a radical Islamic state to have nuclear weapons.

So which part of "Western Civilization" is going to stop them?
It will be interesting to see how many nations join together, overtly or covertly. The U.S. would undoubtedly take the lead, as the world's only superpower. We only await a particularly good excuse. If one does not come soon enough, surely one can be "arranged."
Stratfor Wrote:Iran will be referred to the United Nations Security Council and may face sanctions over its nuclear program, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told the British Broadcasting Corp. on Jan. 30. Straw expects the referral to take place Feb. 2, when the IAEA meets.

Apparently, Russkies and Chinese agreed to go this far (not too far).
Iran is 100 times the threat that Iraq was.
Iraq was not a threat at all.
Where is the huffing and puffing bush now?
Is he a COWARD when faced with an enemy that can actually put up some resistance?
Wait and see.
Wait and See -- this is what we were doing, right?

Debka Wrote:DEBKAfile Exclusive: Moscow believes Iran has developed a large nuclear device in its “preliminary stage.”
Russian FM Sergei Lavrov put this information before the five permanent UN Security Council and Germany, which Tuesday night, Jan. 30, agreed for the first time to haul Iran before the UN body over its nuclear program. Until then, Moscow and Beijing had stood out against the UN nuclear watchdog’ referring the Iran dossier to the Security Council. Tehran hit back Wednesday by saying the decision was unconstructive and the end of diplomacy

According to Lavrov, Russian intelligence estimates that Iran is now capable of detonating this non-weaponized nuclear device - or in other words carrying out its first nuclear test.

DEBKAfile sources add: This estimate which Russian president Vladimir Putin passed to President George Bush some weeks ago is challenged by US and Israeli nuclear experts, who do not believe Iran is up to the stage of a nuclear device. However, on Jan. 21, the opposition FDI claimed Iran would carry out its first nuclear test before the Iranian new year, which falls on March 20.

Ahead of the IAEA’s Thursday meeting in Vienna, a leaked report claimed Iran had last week given the watchdog sensitive documents which apparently showed how to mold highly enriched uranium into the hemispherical shape of warheads, in an effort to stave off referral to the Security Council. At the same time, according to the same unnamed diplomats, the agency passed to Tehran intelligence provided by the US that suggests Iran has been working on details of nuclear weapons, such as missile trajectories and ideal altitudes for exploding warheads. When the IAEA asked Iran for an explanation of the documents, Tehran replied they had been obtained from members of a nuclear black market network.

Still ahead of the nuclear watchdog’s meeting, Moscow and Beijing dispatched diplomats to Tehran to explain that their support for referral to the Security Council did not mean an end to diplomacy.


Referring the issue to the UN would have a “very big effect” on oil prices, Libyan Energy Scretary Fathi Hamed bin-Shatwan said Tuesday at an OPEC meeting in Vienna.
Yea!!! :twisted:
ag Wrote:Yea!!! :twisted:

Wow.

I wonder if the Saudis know that their best oil-producing regions have lots of Shia whose interests a nuclear-armed Iran will naturally protect...
Interesting that Stratfor took this seriously enuf to explain.

Quote:Saudi Arabia on Feb. 2 accused the West of having a double standard on nuclear technology, under which Israel can maintain an arsenal of nuclear warheads while others in the region are prevented from doing the same. The Saudis are not really worried about Israel; rather, they are concerned about Iran's efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon, especially given the growing Persian Shiite influence in Iraq, the country that hitherto served as a buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These deepening concerns could result in a Saudi-Pakistani alignment of sorts on the nuclear issues, as Islamabad has its own concerns about a nuclear Iran.
........................
Hey Thai

Dubyah already stated that Iran "will not have nuclear weapons".

So many in the world just can't get plain language in their heads.

Right here in the US, we have people who are "disturbed" lol that Dubyah is keeping every campaign promise to the best of his ability.

"FOUL" they say when he tries to do what he promised to try to accomplish. lol

I truly hope this comes to a head during his presidency. He WILL make the hard choices

Bean
KenBean Wrote:Right here in the US, we have people who are "disturbed" :lol: that Dubyah is keeping every campaign promise to the best of his ability.

Well, the promise about Iran was not a campaign promise, and what if it so happens that it is beyond Bush' ability to keep?....

For example, if Iran has it already....

[/quote]
Hi MV
Good points.

I'm drawing a senior moment blank here, but Dubyah made that remark in the "Triangle of evil?" speech naming the three connected bad boy countries....not in a campaign speech.

I do feel that Russia has a distinct horror of Iran with a nuke as well.

Finding an already existing nuke might be impossible, true, but perhaps not so hard to blow up the guy/guys who might threaten to use it.

In the final analysis we would be right back in the M.A.D.D. situation, but wholly disproportionately.

"USE" of a WMD would automatically cancel all restraint.
Bean
KenBean Wrote:Finding an already existing nuke might be impossible...
I'm not sure, there are russian specialists in Iran and some of them for sure are ... "multifunctional' specialists, or not so multifunctional, but not too technical for sure...
You gotta understand... the tracking of Nukes through espionage activity revolves around the accounting of the few individuals with the knowledge and ability to design, build, and maintain them. The ones who are mysteriously missing from their normal activities become prime targets for discovery. Likewise, tracing equipment and required supplies also narrows the search.

The territory itself may be huge, but intelligent work can hunt down exactly where our interests should lie.

We may not need to bomb the country into a pile of rubbish, if the easy steps can get done in first.
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