05-25-2004, 12:24 AM
You know, with all this talk of Chalabi and spying, there are interesting aspects to Iranian government that should be considered.
You might wonder why this is important. What has changed in Iran since the loss of Saddam Hussein? It may be due to the fact that Saddam, as Iranâs strongest enemy had a powerful influence on Iran and its people, changing much of their geopolitical strategy. After the US ouster of Saddam, Iran finds itself in a different field fraught with both risk and opportunity.
I recently had the opportunity, through the miracle of close circuit television, to hear a lecture from Anoushiravan Ehteshami, the Professor of International Relations at the University of Durham. He was VP of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies until last year, so he does have some good background and expertise.
We can go back to March 2003 and the series of political fires in Teherans centers of power. These were increased by the pitched domestic political battles of these centers of power. Parliament, the President, the Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council (to name several) and others. Iran is unique from Sudan, Afghanistan and other Islamist regimes. It is the only surviving Islamic revolutionary state in the world today. It is openly anti-American and defies the US. It is the founding supporter of Hizbullah and has acted as the âgodfatherâ for a number of Islamic organizations around the Muslim world. It is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons capability but it does not really resemble such rogue states as Syria, Libya (in the past), or even North Korea as far as domestic politics is concerned. Its political scene is open, it has the vote, there is a great deal of debate in Iran (relative to most other Muslim nations) and it is generally a civil debate (generally). As a matter of fact, if Bush were looking for a good model of Middle Eastern democracy, one could do worse that look at Iran. But Iran still faces a hostile US given the many other issues the government has in foreign policy. Iran is also unique for another reason. Its foreign policy, especially towards the US has to deal with the fact that it is sitting on top of an increasingly nationalistic order that is dissatisfied with Iranâs current foreign relations and that its society is unique in being pro American and for wanting closer ties with the US. An isolated Iran cannot satisfy the appetite of the Iranâs youth (which make up most of the population) and their desire to interact with the outside world and the US in particular.
In the 1980âs, Iranâs main goal was to topple Saddam Hussein. They failed, and they failed miserably. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had to accept an Iraqi cease fire. Mostly because of Iranian mistakes in battle (including the use of WMD chemical weapons) and their failure in the diplomatic arena to isolate Iraq. Iraq by virtue of its alliance with the US and Europe was not going away.
When Saddam Hussein fell Iran was extremely happy. While many centers of power were overjoyed to see Iraq fall, to avoid appearing to endorse the US (ie an American War), Iranian officials publicly adopted a skeptical line of analysis questioning the US motives (wow! Iranian leadership is really allied to the democrats!). So Saddams fall seemed to clear up some basic problems for Iran, but then other problems arose.
To understand this we have to understand there are six key policy realms act as checks and balances for both domestic and international policy.
1-There are several interagency rivalries involved and they impact every policy both domestic and international. They include the Leaders Office (influenced by the theocracy that oversees government), the Presidency (which controls the ministers), the support of the presidency by the National Security Council, the Majihs, the Council of Guardians, the Expediency council (which theoretically makes working between the different councils easier), and finally the Revolutionary Guardian council which is headed by Major General Mohsen Rezai). The Revolutionary Guard actively acts as a counterweight of the Presidency and often criticizes it while defining the presidents limits in foreign policy through it criticism. They work through the Padaran or âranks of the guardâ.
2-The general political factionism as expressed in one also impacts the power. In short each group is in it for their factions and they create temporary alliances (who will be voted off the island next?). The debates between these factions usually take place in the context of âsaving the revolutionâ something the US did in its Federalist papers. The debates are about how the ânezamâ or system can be changed to help keep the revolution alive. Everyone quotes the old Ayatollah Khomeini the way we have often quoted Washington or Hamilton or Jefferson. Usually they use the quotes to gain political power. Even by those who want more open relations with the US. To these factions, foreign policy is a tactical weapon used to beat down domestic challenges.
3-That is the third part. They use foreign policy to battle domestic issues. A bit like Kerry saying âthe foreign governments, they like me, they really really like meâ (a la Sally Fields). Discussion about restoring ties to the allow more conservative elements to attack other less conservative elements on the foreign agenda in order to also squelch their domestic agenda. Politically the US is a political football, nothing more.
4-Since 1991 the Iranian economy has begun to develop into such a level as to affect foreign policy. Iran is a single commodity exporter and mostly exports to Japan and Europe. In the 1990âs Iran tried to create greater foreign investment and even toyed with the idea of âfree trade zonesâ. But the huge drop in oil prices in the 1990âs killed the idea. It is ironic that the more Iran relied on oil to get it out of poverty and give itself control, the less control Iran actually had on their foreign policy and economic considerations began to dominate Iranian foreign policy over ideology. It became more dependent of foreign purchases that less independence in the minds of the old guard. The economic isolationists began to take a back seat.
5-Finally there is a pissed off population in Iran. The masses want jobs AND more political freedom. In Iran 60% of the unemployed are between 15 â 24. 28% of the youth are unemployed and 80% of the youth employed make less than 125/ month. The government has not created more jobs either. The youth expect the government, if not to make jobs, to at least create an environment were jobs can be created. In my opinion it sounds like smart youths that would act as a Prometheus unbound in regard to the future.
OK, its late and I have to hit the sack, will type more on this tomorrow.
You might wonder why this is important. What has changed in Iran since the loss of Saddam Hussein? It may be due to the fact that Saddam, as Iranâs strongest enemy had a powerful influence on Iran and its people, changing much of their geopolitical strategy. After the US ouster of Saddam, Iran finds itself in a different field fraught with both risk and opportunity.
I recently had the opportunity, through the miracle of close circuit television, to hear a lecture from Anoushiravan Ehteshami, the Professor of International Relations at the University of Durham. He was VP of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies until last year, so he does have some good background and expertise.
We can go back to March 2003 and the series of political fires in Teherans centers of power. These were increased by the pitched domestic political battles of these centers of power. Parliament, the President, the Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council (to name several) and others. Iran is unique from Sudan, Afghanistan and other Islamist regimes. It is the only surviving Islamic revolutionary state in the world today. It is openly anti-American and defies the US. It is the founding supporter of Hizbullah and has acted as the âgodfatherâ for a number of Islamic organizations around the Muslim world. It is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons capability but it does not really resemble such rogue states as Syria, Libya (in the past), or even North Korea as far as domestic politics is concerned. Its political scene is open, it has the vote, there is a great deal of debate in Iran (relative to most other Muslim nations) and it is generally a civil debate (generally). As a matter of fact, if Bush were looking for a good model of Middle Eastern democracy, one could do worse that look at Iran. But Iran still faces a hostile US given the many other issues the government has in foreign policy. Iran is also unique for another reason. Its foreign policy, especially towards the US has to deal with the fact that it is sitting on top of an increasingly nationalistic order that is dissatisfied with Iranâs current foreign relations and that its society is unique in being pro American and for wanting closer ties with the US. An isolated Iran cannot satisfy the appetite of the Iranâs youth (which make up most of the population) and their desire to interact with the outside world and the US in particular.
In the 1980âs, Iranâs main goal was to topple Saddam Hussein. They failed, and they failed miserably. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had to accept an Iraqi cease fire. Mostly because of Iranian mistakes in battle (including the use of WMD chemical weapons) and their failure in the diplomatic arena to isolate Iraq. Iraq by virtue of its alliance with the US and Europe was not going away.
When Saddam Hussein fell Iran was extremely happy. While many centers of power were overjoyed to see Iraq fall, to avoid appearing to endorse the US (ie an American War), Iranian officials publicly adopted a skeptical line of analysis questioning the US motives (wow! Iranian leadership is really allied to the democrats!). So Saddams fall seemed to clear up some basic problems for Iran, but then other problems arose.
To understand this we have to understand there are six key policy realms act as checks and balances for both domestic and international policy.
1-There are several interagency rivalries involved and they impact every policy both domestic and international. They include the Leaders Office (influenced by the theocracy that oversees government), the Presidency (which controls the ministers), the support of the presidency by the National Security Council, the Majihs, the Council of Guardians, the Expediency council (which theoretically makes working between the different councils easier), and finally the Revolutionary Guardian council which is headed by Major General Mohsen Rezai). The Revolutionary Guard actively acts as a counterweight of the Presidency and often criticizes it while defining the presidents limits in foreign policy through it criticism. They work through the Padaran or âranks of the guardâ.
2-The general political factionism as expressed in one also impacts the power. In short each group is in it for their factions and they create temporary alliances (who will be voted off the island next?). The debates between these factions usually take place in the context of âsaving the revolutionâ something the US did in its Federalist papers. The debates are about how the ânezamâ or system can be changed to help keep the revolution alive. Everyone quotes the old Ayatollah Khomeini the way we have often quoted Washington or Hamilton or Jefferson. Usually they use the quotes to gain political power. Even by those who want more open relations with the US. To these factions, foreign policy is a tactical weapon used to beat down domestic challenges.
3-That is the third part. They use foreign policy to battle domestic issues. A bit like Kerry saying âthe foreign governments, they like me, they really really like meâ (a la Sally Fields). Discussion about restoring ties to the allow more conservative elements to attack other less conservative elements on the foreign agenda in order to also squelch their domestic agenda. Politically the US is a political football, nothing more.
4-Since 1991 the Iranian economy has begun to develop into such a level as to affect foreign policy. Iran is a single commodity exporter and mostly exports to Japan and Europe. In the 1990âs Iran tried to create greater foreign investment and even toyed with the idea of âfree trade zonesâ. But the huge drop in oil prices in the 1990âs killed the idea. It is ironic that the more Iran relied on oil to get it out of poverty and give itself control, the less control Iran actually had on their foreign policy and economic considerations began to dominate Iranian foreign policy over ideology. It became more dependent of foreign purchases that less independence in the minds of the old guard. The economic isolationists began to take a back seat.
5-Finally there is a pissed off population in Iran. The masses want jobs AND more political freedom. In Iran 60% of the unemployed are between 15 â 24. 28% of the youth are unemployed and 80% of the youth employed make less than 125/ month. The government has not created more jobs either. The youth expect the government, if not to make jobs, to at least create an environment were jobs can be created. In my opinion it sounds like smart youths that would act as a Prometheus unbound in regard to the future.
OK, its late and I have to hit the sack, will type more on this tomorrow.
"I detest the man who hides one thing in the depths of his heart and speaks forth another"
-Homer
-Homer
